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Audits as Signals 
Maciej H. Kotowski,† David A. Weisbach†† & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
Those charged with enforcing laws or regulations, or rules of 
any sort, (collectively “bureaus”) often require regulated entities 
or individuals (agents) to submit reports on their activities. Bu-
reaus enforce compliance by auditing the reports and imposing 
punishments when misreporting is identified. For example, a 
bureau charged with enforcing environmental laws might re-
quire polluters to report whether they are in compliance. A bu-
reau charged with enforcing occupational-safety rules might re-
quire companies to report accidents. In both cases, it is common 
practice to audit some fraction of reports and to impose penalties 
when underreporting is discovered. Similarly, tax administra-
tors rely heavily on self-reporting of tax liability and audit only 
a fraction of reports. Prosecutors or police regularly ask for self-
reports from suspects by asking for a confession. They offer to 
lower the criminal sanction for a confession. Higher sanctions 
for failure to confess if guilt is ultimately assessed are akin to 
sanctions for underreporting. Contracts, commercial relation-
ships, and personal relationships may use similar principles. 
The apparent purpose of this type of enforcement system, 
which we will call a self-report audit (SRA) strategy, is to reduce 
enforcement costs. If only a fraction of reports have to be audit-
ed, costs may be lower than the alternative of directly monitor-
ing a population. For this strategy to work, however, agents 
must have an incentive to send in informative reports. In some 
settings only biased reports can be expected. Reports of emis-
sions, accidents, and income may be shaved downwards if agents 
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suspect that there will be little expected cost to doing so. In 
many settings, however, appropriate incentives can elicit accu-
rate reports. If agents know, for example, that an inaccurate re-
port is likely to be detected and punished, they may send in ac-
curate reports rather than face sanctions. 
Most of the literature on auditing and self-reporting consid-
ers the case in which a regulated party has private information 
and the goal of the reporting system is to induce the individual 
to reveal that information.1 The regulated party is assumed to 
know the capabilities of the auditing bureau. Individuals, for 
example, are assumed to know the ability of the tax administra-
tor to catch cheats. Criminals deciding whether to confess are 
assumed to know what information the government has against 
them and the likelihood of a successful prosecution. 
The world would be a simpler place, and law and economics 
of much less interest, if these information conditions were wide-
ly found. We suspect, however, that in many cases, the agent is 
unsure about the capabilities of the bureau because the agent 
knows neither the auditing technology that the bureau possess-
es nor the information it already has. 
In such cases, there is not just one information asymmetry, 
but two. Thus, we drop the assumption that the agent knows 
what the bureau knows and consider the enriched auditing prob-
lem. The agent is assumed to have private information about its 
behavior or type, but to have at best imperfect knowledge of the 
quality of the bureau’s auditing capability, which is private 
 
  1  The modern statement of the problem in the tax-enforcement context began with 
Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde, Income Tax Compliance in a Principal-Agent 
Framework, 26 J Pub Econ 1, 4 (1985). In the tax context, see also Kim C. Border and 
Joel Sobel, Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder, 54 Rev Econ Stud 
525, 527 (1987) (generalizing the work of Reinganum and Wilde); Dilip Mookherjee and 
Ivan Png, Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution, 104 Q J Econ 399, 406 
(1989); Helmuth Cremer and Firouz Gahvari, Tax Evasion and the Optimum General 
Income Tax, 60 J Pub Econ 235, 240–47 (1995); Parkash Chander and Louis L. Wilde, A 
General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement, 65 Rev Econ Stud 165, 
175–76, 181–82 (1998); Suzanne Scotchmer, Audit Classes and Tax Enforcement Policy, 
77 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 229, 230–32 (1987). In the torts context, see 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of 
Behavior, 102 J Polit Econ 583, 601–03 (1994). Auditing in the environmental context 
has been studied by Arun S. Malik, Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for 
Regulating Stochastic Pollution, 24 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 241, 249–54 (1993). For a gen-
eral review of the auditing literature, see Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, 
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model 121–26 (Princeton 2002).  
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information to the bureau.2 For example, an individual seeking 
to hide assets in a foreign bank account has only a rough esti-
mate of how likely the tax administrator is to find them. A pol-
luter required to report environmental emissions is not certain 
whether the bureau can detect its emissions. Criminals deciding 
whether to confess may not know what evidence the government 
has against them. 
How should the bureau set an SRA strategy when its audit-
ing capabilities are private information, which agents can only 
infer? This additional asymmetry changes the game between the 
parties. If their auditing capabilities are public information, bu-
reaus have no incentive to engage in costly strategic behavior. 
But if those capabilities are private information, bureaus will 
act strategically to convey or avoid conveying information about 
their capabilities. A bureau with good auditing capabilities 
might engage in costly signaling to convince agents of this fact. 
A bureau with weak capabilities might mimic its stronger peers 
to enhance its deterrent capability. In both cases, signaling and 
mimicking strategies have to consider how both agents and oth-
er bureau types will react. The strategies must operate in an 
equilibrium in which bureaus are strategic and agents try to in-
fer information about the bureaus’ quality and then send in re-
ports given the inferences the agents draw. 
Policy makers have a strategic option as well. Sometimes 
they will want to encourage mimicking by weak bureaus to allow 
them to better enforce laws when auditing is difficult, but at 
other times they will want to encourage strong bureaus to dif-
ferentiate themselves to aid their enforcement. Given that 
 
  2  A very similar environment is studied by Mark B. Cronshaw and James Alm, 
Tax Compliance with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 23 Pub Fin Q 139, 161–63 (1995). In their 
model, both the agent and the bureau have private information. However, the bureau in 
their model cannot commit to an auditing policy. Hence, their analysis does not encom-
pass the signaling aspects that form the core of our analysis. Inés Macho-Stadler and J. 
David Pérez-Castrillo, Auditing with Signals, 69 Economica 1, 10–12 (2002), present a 
model in which the tax authority receives a private signal of the taxpayer’s income, so 
they have two-sided private information similar to ours. In our structure, unlike theirs, 
the bureau’s private information need not be correlated with the taxpayer’s income and 
may reflect general features of the environment. Moreover, in their model, the bureau 
has to declare an audit strategy before it receives the private signal, whereas in ours, the 
bureau knows its auditing capabilities before setting a strategy. Other authors have con-
sidered the possibility of imperfect auditing. See, for example, Hsiao-Chi Chen and Shi-
Miin Liu, Incentive Contracts under Imperfect Auditing, 76 Manchester School 131, 138–
48 (2008); David P. Baron and David Besanko, Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and 
Auditing, 15 RAND J Econ 447, 452–64 (1984); Malik, 24 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at 244 
(cited in note 1).  
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agents draw information about one bureau from the behavior of 
others, however, there will be cross-bureau externalities. Policy 
makers will have to consider overall strategies and appropriate-
ly balance the costs and benefits of mimicking versus signaling, 
essentially of pooling and separating equilibria. 
We provide core intuitions and legal applications of such a 
model. A formal model and proofs of our results appear else-
where.3 We begin with motivating examples, describe the core 
features of our model, and then turn to applications. 
I.  MOTIVATING EXAMPLES 
Bureaus often use self-reporting to enforce laws or regula-
tions. There are numerous straightforward examples, such as 
the self-reporting system used by most countries for taxation or 
a requirement to report environmental spills.4 Banks are re-
quired to report their levels of capital to bank regulators.5 Driv-
ers are required to report traffic accidents to the police. Compa-
nies are required to report financial information to various 
regulators.6 Drug companies are required to report adverse reac-
tions, and device makers must submit declarations of conformity 
to the Food and Drug Administration.7 The Occupational Safety 
and Health Agency requires employers to report work-related 
deaths or multiple hospitalizations within eight hours.8 
Self-reporting can also arise in contexts in which the actions 
are not conventional reports. Any time one party asks another 
for information to enforce a stricture, it is effectively using the 
self-reporting strategy. In criminal law, asking for a confession 
or just interviewing a suspect is effectively asking for a self-report. 
 
  3  See generally Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach, and Richard J. Zeck-
hauser, Signaling with Audits: Mimicry, Wasteful Expenditures, and Non-compliance in 
a Model of Tax Enforcement (Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper 
RWP14-001, Jan 2014), online at https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile 
.aspx?Id=1018 (visited Mar 2, 2014). 
  4  See, for example, 40 CFR § 110.9 (requiring reporting discharges of oil under 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 40 CFR § 302.6 (requiring reporting of discharges 
of hazardous substances under the Clean Water Act). 
  5  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revisions to the Basel II Market 
Risk Framework *13–15 (Bank for International Settlements July 2009), online at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014), implemented at Department 
of the Treasury, Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market Risk, 77 Fed Reg 53060, 53110–
11 (2012) (amending 12 CFR § 325). 
  6  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), Pub L No 73-291, 48 Stat 881, 894, 
codified at 15 USC § 78m(a). 
  7  See 21 CFR § 803.10. 
  8  See 29 CFR § 1904.39(a).  
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The police or prosecutors may encourage self-reporting by offer-
ing to reduce penalties in exchange for a confession or for turn-
ing yourself in. They may audit self-reports by deciding whether 
and when to seek further evidence. Contracting parties may ask 
about the progress of performance, effectively asking the other 
party for a report. A misreport can lead to the loss of future 
business or a lawsuit. 
A recent Supreme Court decision, Arizona v Inter Tribal 
Council of Arizona, Inc,9 concerned a self-reporting strategy. The 
National Voter Registration Act, a federal law, requires that ap-
plicants self-declare their eligibility rather than provide docu-
mentary evidence.10 This is a self-reporting system. Arizona in-
stead wanted a system in which people had to prove their 
eligibility. Although the Court decided the case on preemption 
grounds,11 an important ongoing dispute about voter identifica-
tion revolves around the effectiveness of a self-reporting strate-
gy. 
Because of its prominence, the SRA strategy has received 
attention from both legal scholars and economists.12 A basic re-
sult is that the strategy often makes sense: in a setting in which 
the goal is deterrence, setting the penalty for bad behavior that 
is self-reported slightly lower than the expected penalty for the 
behavior when it is not self-reported creates an incentive for 
truthful reports without changing the first-order effects of the 
underlying law.13 To illustrate, consider a risk-neutral agent 
who engages in a sanctionable activity.14 If the agent does not 
self-report a violation, the fine is $1,000 and the probability that 
the bureau detects the violation is 10 percent, implying that the 
expected sanction is $100. If the sanction on an agent who self-
reports is $99, the agent is better off reporting, but there is no 
first-order change in the sanction. Enforcement costs, however, 
are reduced, which enables this self-reporting system to outper-
form a system that relies on direct monitoring. 
 
  9  133 S Ct 2247 (2013). 
  10  National Voter Registration Act of 1993 § 9(b), Pub L No 103-31, 107 Stat 77, 87, 
codified at 42 USC § 1973gg-7(b). 
  11 See  Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 133 S Ct at 2256–57. 
  12  See notes 1–2. For a summary of the legal literature, see A. Mitchell Polinsky 
and Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in A. Mitchell Polinsky 
and Steven Shavell, eds, 1 Handbook of Law and Economics 403, 405–54 (North-Holland 
2007). 
  13  See Kaplow and Shavell, 102 J Polit Econ at 584–85 (cited in note 1). 
  14  This example is taken from Polinsky and Shavell, The Theory of Public 
Enforcement of Law at 437–38 (cited in note 12).  
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Most of the existing models have a similar structure: The 
agent has private information about his situation that he re-
ports to the bureau. The bureau then audits some of the reports 
according to a policy that depends on what is reported. 
The novel element of our analysis is that bureaus differ in 
their capabilities. Moreover, though bureaus know their capabil-
ities, agents do not. Agents have only a subjective probability 
distribution. Capabilities differ because some bureaus are better 
able to detect the truth or have more audit resources. For exam-
ple, the IRS can easily detect hidden income when it has infor-
mation returns from payers. A taxpayer may not know how ef-
fectively the IRS matches information returns with individuals’ 
returns, but has some estimate of the probability. In other cases, 
the bureau may not be able to detect the truth or may be able to 
do so only at significant cost. The IRS has a difficult time finding 
income that is well hidden in foreign jurisdictions. It has no easy 
tracing technology, but it may have secret sharing arrangements 
with foreign banks. A taxpayer with assets stashed overseas 
may not know what behind-the-scenes contacts the IRS has es-
tablished with the foreign government or foreign payers (for ex-
ample, Swiss banks). He can only estimate what the IRS 
knows.15 
This two-sided asymmetric-information problem describes 
many, but by no means all, auditing situations. With the IRS, 
for example, audits are not publicized; they are considered pri-
vate information between the IRS and the taxpayer, unless an 
audit dispute ends up in court. This means that individuals are 
unlikely to know the true auditing capabilities of the IRS as this 
information is revealed coarsely and sporadically. The IRS, un-
derstanding this dynamic, puffs its capabilities just prior to the 
April 15 filing deadline by publicizing multiple tax-fraud cases.16 
Criminal investigations also likely involve two-sided private 
information. The police asking a suspect for a self-report—
Professor Plum, did you have the revolver in the conservatory? 
 
  15  See Department of Justice, United States and Switzerland Issue Joint Statement 
regarding Tax Evasion Investigations, Office of Public Affairs (Department of Justice Tax 
Division Aug 29, 2013), online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/August/13-tax-
975.html (visited Mar 2, 2014). 
  16  See Joshua D. Blank and Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 
30 Va Tax Rev 1, 15–18 (2010).  
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—may purposefully keep the extent of their knowledge secret, 
believing that they get better revelation by doing so.17 
In other cases, most or nearly all information about the bu-
reau’s auditing capabilities is public. The bureau may have to 
publish its examination procedures, which may be purely me-
chanical.18 Or a large entity that is audited frequently may have 
institutional knowledge of the quality of audits, as may profes-
sional advisors, such as lawyers and accountants. Nevertheless, 
the real world throws up a variety of cases in which two-sided 
private information is present and important. In them, new 
questions get posed; new results emerge. 
II.  BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL 
Our formal model, like most, simplifies for clarity and trac-
tability. We describe the basic structure of the model using non-
technical terminology. 
There is a single, risk-neutral agent who must comply with 
a particular stricture, such as paying tax liability, using a man-
dated pollution-control technology, providing a safe workplace, 
or complying with a contract. There are only two types of agents, 
High and Low. (A more complex model would allow for multiple 
types.) For example, a taxpayer may earn high or low income, a 
polluter may have high levels or low levels of emissions, a crimi-
nal may be guilty or innocent, and so forth. The agent’s type—
High or Low—is private information, known initially only to the 
agent, although the bureau knows the probability that the agent 
is High or Low. The agent must report his type to the bureau, 
possibly accurately, possibly not. For example, a high-earning 
taxpayer might report that he earned a high amount and pay 
the associated tax liability, or he might underreport and pay a 
lower amount. A polluter might report that it is using the man-
dated technology (equivalent to a low report) or that it is not (a 
high report). A crime suspect may confess or claim innocence. In 
each case, the misreport precipitates a punishment if discovered 
during an audit. 
 
  17  They may even forgo revealing information in one case in which it would be help-
ful, if they think it better to keep suspects guessing in cases in which they do not have 
information. 
  18  See, for example, Internal Revenue Service, The Examination (Audit) Process 
(Jan 2006), online at http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Examination-(Audit)-Process (visited 
Mar 2, 2014).  
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The risk-neutral bureau receives the report and decides 
whether to audit the agent. As with agents, there are two types 
of bureaus, strong and weak. A strong bureau will discover the 
agent’s type if it chooses to audit. A weak bureau will not. (We 
assume the extreme case in which strong bureaus are perfect 
auditors and weak bureaus completely hopeless. Realistic cases 
will lie in between.) The bureau knows its type; the agent has 
only a subjective probability on those types. In all cases, each 
audit costs the bureau a fixed amount of money.19 
If a bureau audits the agent and finds that a High agent 
falsely claimed to be a Low agent, the agent will be penalized. A 
third party, such as Congress, determines the maximum penalty 
that the bureau can impose. Within these preset bounds, howev-
er, the bureau may impose any penalty that it finds justified.20 A 
truthful report never gets penalized. That is, there are no Type I 
errors in which the agent truthfully reports being Low but the 
audit concludes (incorrectly) that he is High.21 
Three critical assumptions define the game. First, objec-
tives: agents seek to minimize their expected costs; bureaus seek 
to maximize their expected revenue net of costs. In the tax case, 
the IRS chooses its audit and penalty structure to maximize the 
sum of tax payments plus penalties less audit costs. If it is using 
effluent charges, the EPA maximizes the charge plus the penal-
ties for misreporting less audit costs. 
If a bureau imposes mandates, the bureau uses the shadow 
value of the mandate (that is, the behavioral change produced 
by the mandate multiplied by the shadow price on that change) 
instead of receipts in the maximand. For example, if the EPA 
imposes a pollution-control mandate, such as a best-available-
control-technology rule, it maximizes the reduction in pollution 
times the shadow price of a unit reduction, plus penalties for 
misreporting, less audit costs. Prosecutors maximize the shadow 
value of imprisoning a guilty individual times convictions, less 
the costs of investigating. 
An alternative would have the bureau set the audit and 
penalty rates to maximize compliance with the law. If compliance 
 
  19  For simplicity, we do not include the agent’s cost of audit. 
  20  As we argue below, the bounds set by Congress on the bureau’s policies are a key 
factor behind the effectiveness of its enforcement actions. Perhaps surprisingly, leaving 
the bureau unconstrained may not be the best policy. 
  21  There is no penalty for overpaying: if a Low-type agent claims to be a High-type 
agent, he pays the fee associated with his declaration. This, however, does not happen in 
our model.  
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were the goal, penalties would be a means to an end, not an end 
in themselves. Penalties would not enter directly into the bu-
reau’s maximand. 
Many bureaus likely come closer to maximizing revenue 
than compliance. They may do so implicitly in response to the 
internal incentives of their employees. Thus, an individual po-
liceman might increase his chances for promotion by maximizing 
arrests and fines rather than adopting a strategy that reduces 
crime and produces few arrests. Without arrests, he may not be 
able to show to his superiors that he is doing his job. Prosecutors 
may maximize convictions rather than compliance for similar 
reasons. Police seeking forfeitures of property may prefer to 
maximize total revenue rather than just compliance because 
they are often allowed to keep the forfeited items. Bureaus may 
also maximize revenue because their overall performance is 
evaluated on this basis. For example, a tax bureau may be eval-
uated based on the revenue it brings in. While maximizing reve-
nue may not be the goal of all agencies, it is likely an important 
objective for many. 
Second, our formulation posits that the underlying legal 
rule that is being enforced is set separately from the audit and 
enforcement strategy. For example, we assume that the tax 
schedule and allowable penalties are set by Congress, while the 
audit and enforcement strategy is set by the IRS. The same sep-
aration holds for criminal law (crimes and punishments are 
specified by the legislature, but enforcement is left to the police 
and prosecutors), for environmental law, and most other con-
texts in which bureaus use SRA strategies to enforce the law. 
Such separation of rule and enforcement procedure can be 
costly. Ideally, a policy maker would consider the legal rule and 
its enforcement mechanism simultaneously, thereby optimizing 
the net effect.22 One way to view our approach is to posit that the 
underlying legal rules are specified and that bureaus then ad-
dress the enforcement problem. Given this formulation, legisla-
tures could design legal rules taking the enforcement solution as 
a constraint on this problem. The overall optimization would 
then be a two-stage game with different players controlling the 
 
  22  Some of the auditing literature allows both the underlying legal rule and the au-
dit mechanism to be set simultaneously. See Reinganum and Wilde, 26 J Pub Econ at 2 
(cited in note 1).  
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two stages.23 The restriction is invoked not primarily to simplify 
the problem, but rather to reflect reality. In many cases it re-
flects how policies are actually set, with Congress setting the 
substantive rules but delegating enforcement to an agency. 
Third, a bureau can commit to an audit strategy. It an-
nounces that strategy, and the agent sends in a report. If the 
audit strategy elicits truthful reports, the bureau has no incen-
tive to audit and would prefer not to given that audits cost mon-
ey. However, today’s actions serve as tomorrow’s announced au-
dit strategy, which reduces any temptation to break 
commitments.24 If the bureau has a continuing existence, as vir-
tually all do, the commitment problem vanishes. 
III.  RESULTS AND APPLICATIONS  
If bureau capabilities are private information, agents must 
guess whether they are reporting to a strong bureau or a weak 
bureau. If agents believe that the bureau is weak, they can re-
port a low amount with impunity. If they believe that the bu-
reau is strong, they have to expect the possibility of audits and 
penalties if they send in a low report. 
Because agents will report based on their beliefs about the 
bureau’s auditing capability, bureaus have an incentive to act so 
that agents will believe they are strong and make truthful re-
ports. Weak bureaus thus have an incentive to mimic strong bu-
reaus; strong bureaus have an incentive to deter mimicking by 
“signaling”: taking actions that weak bureaus would find costly 
to follow. A strong bureau that is able to ensure that agents 
know it is strong may be able to save on auditing costs. These 
mimicking and signaling behaviors drive our conclusions. 
The interplay between agents trying to infer bureau types 
and bureaus trying to mimic and differentiate produces three 
types of equilibria for bureau strategies: separating (strong and 
weak bureaus pursue different audit strategies, and thus reveal 
their types), pooling (strong and weak bureaus adopt the same 
audit strategy), and semiseparating (some weak bureaus an-
nounce the same strategy as strong bureaus (mimic) and some 
weak bureaus announce a different strategy (reveal)). If there is 
 
  23  This approach is taken in Isabel Sánchez and Joel Sobel, Hierachical Design and 
Enforcement of Income Tax Policies, 50 J Pub Econ 345, 346 (1993). 
  24  For examples of models without commitment, see Fahad Khalil, Auditing 
without Commitment, 28 RAND J Econ 629, 633–37 (1997); Cronshaw and Alm, 23 Pub 
Fin Q at 140–41 (cited in note 2).  
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a pooling or semiseparating equilibrium, agents will have only a 
probabilistic estimate of a bureau’s type. 
The table below summarizes the possibilities. The columns 
represent the three equilibria for bureaus: separating, semisep-
arating, and pooling. The rows represent the behavior of High 
agents who may always report their true type (all Highs honest), 
sometimes report their true type, or always misreport. The pay-
offs to the bureaus are represented by the payoff to strong bu-
reaus, S, to weak bureaus that mimic the strong bureaus’ strat-
egy, WM, and to weak bureaus that do not mimic strong bureaus 
and therefore reveal their type, WR. 
TABLE 1.  BUREAU BEHAVIOR 
 
Agent 
Behavior  Separating Semiseparating  Pooling 
All Highs 
Honest  Not possible  Not possible  WR ≤ WM = S 
Some  
Highs 
Misreport 
WM = WR = S  WR = WM < S  WR ≤ WM < S 
All Highs 
Misreport  Not possible  Not possible  W = S 
Below we highlight some of the important cases, focusing in 
particular on the two underlined cases. Before moving to the de-
tails, note that in a separating equilibrium—the first column—
agents will always misreport to weak bureaus because they 
know which bureaus are weak. Agents may, however, report ac-
curately to strong bureaus because agents know that they are 
strong. The table lists this as “Some Highs Misreport,” but it is 
important to keep in mind that this means that if there are 
some weak bureaus and some strong bureaus, all Highs are like-
ly to report honestly to strong bureaus and will misreport to 
weak bureaus. This characterization is based on interpreting the 
model as involving many bureaus, some strong and some weak. 
In this case, Highs will sometimes misreport (to weak bureaus) 
and sometimes report honestly (to strong bureaus). In the semi-
separating and pooling cases, however, an agent will not be  
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certain of a bureau’s capability and may decide that a mixed re-
porting strategy is optimal (see below). 
The bottom-right corner—pooling, all Highs misreport—
describes the case in which audits are too expensive to be 
worthwhile, even for strong bureaus. If there are no audits, all 
Highs report being Low because there is no sanction. Weak bu-
reaus also do not audit, so they receive the same reports and 
their revenue is the same as the revenue of strong bureaus. We 
use W in this case rather than WM because although the weak 
bureau is doing the same thing as the strong bureau, it is doing 
just what it would do if its type were revealed rather than mim-
icking. 
A. Maximum  Penalties 
A standard result in law and economics is that optimal en-
forcement involves a very low audit rate and very high punish-
ments.25 Parodying this conclusion, once a decade someone 
should be executed for double parking. 
This approach to law enforcement is rarely observed and 
commentators have offered a variety of reasons why it may not 
be optimal. For example, if individuals are risk averse (and lia-
bility is strict, not fault based), the strategy of exorbitant fines 
and low audit probabilities imposes undue risk-bearing costs.26 
Similarly, under a theory known as general enforcement, if a 
single enforcement activity detects more than one kind of sanc-
tionable activity, the probability of detection will be the same for 
those activities. If the levels of harm that those activities impose 
differ notably, the optimal fine will correspondingly vary and in 
many cases be below the maximum possible.27 Thus, if a high-
way patrolman observes both reckless driving and driving with-
out a seatbelt, the vastly different levels of expected harm 
 
  25  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Polit 
Econ 169, 180–85 (1968). 
  26  See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between the 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am Econ Rev 880, 884 (1979). See also A. 
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies 
among Individuals, 81 Am Econ Rev 618, 618–19 (1991); A. Mitchell Polinsky and 
Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 
35 J L & Econ 133, 135 (1992). 
  27 Steven  Shavell,  Specific versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J Polit Econ 
1088, 1090 (1991).  
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caused by these violations imply that their penalties should dif-
fer.28 
Our model identifies an additional reason why a policy 
maker may wish to limit the penalties that a bureau is able to 
impose. By constraining a bureau’s abilities to differentiate itself 
by using high penalties, the policy maker can lend credence to 
the signaling actions taken by a bureau or can ensure that a 
pooling outcome remains viable. If signaling or mimicking is de-
sirable—that is, policy makers want bureaus to be in one of the 
underlined boxes—a cap on penalties may be desirable. 
We use a numerical example to illustrate why this is the 
case in a separating equilibrium. (We discuss caps on penalties 
in pooling equilibria in Part III.C.) The basic idea is to identify 
what it takes to be in one of the underlined boxes and to rule out 
the possibility that a bureau can deviate from that strategy. The 
cap on penalties enables this across a range of contexts; it rules 
out profitable deviations, particularly by strong bureaus. 
Suppose that 20 percent of the people have high income, 
produce high pollution, or have a high amount of whatever the 
underlying variable is, and 80 percent have a low amount. The 
statutory payment or shadow value for High is 11; for Low it is 
5. Audits cost 2.5. 
Consider the underlined separating equilibrium (the first 
column in the table) in which agents report accurately to strong 
bureaus but not to weak bureaus (middle row). Suppose that for 
this to occur the bureau must audit 50 percent of low reports. 
For agents to report accurately, the probability of being 
caught times the penalty from being caught has to outweigh 
the benefits of misreporting. In particular, if a High agent re-
ports 5, half the time he is not audited and pays only 5. The 
other half of the time, he is audited and pays 11 + P, where P is 
the penalty for inaccurate reports. To convince the agent to report 
 
  28  Another explanation is that sanctions may need to be set to create progressively 
increasing deterrence for progressively worse activities. If we set the highest possible 
sanction for double parking, we cannot impose yet a higher sanction for stealing and a 
higher one yet for murder. This explanation is similar to (and may be identical to) the 
general enforcement explanation as it holds only if the probability of enforcement cannot 
be fully adjusted across activities. Note also that the declarations setup creates substitu-
tion possibilities across underreports. If truthful reporting is not feasible, it may be de-
sirable to reduce the penalty on mild underreports to induce agents to make them in lieu 
of severe underreports, for example, to report 80 percent of income rather than 60 per-
cent of income.  
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accurately, this outcome must be worse than reporting High and 
paying 11: 
 
0.5 × 5 + 0.5 × (11 + P) ≥ 11 
 
The penalty, therefore, must be at least 6 to induce the agent to 
report accurately. 
This principle is well known: the expected sanction must be 
sufficiently high if inaccurate reporting is to be unwise. When 
there are two types of bureaus and a separating equilibrium, 
however, a second bound comes into play. In a separating equi-
librium, a weak bureau cannot gain by mimicking a strong bu-
reau. 
Agents have no incentive to report more than 5 to a bureau 
known to be weak, since they know that the bureau cannot audit 
effectively. Therefore, absent mimicking, the most that a weak 
bureau can earn is 5. If a strong bureau had an audit strategy 
that earned more than 5 and induced all agents to report hon-
estly, a weak bureau would mimic the strong bureau by adopt-
ing the identical strategy and therefore earn that same greater-
than-5 amount. The fact that a weak bureau cannot enforce 
penalties would matter not at all because agents are reporting 
truthfully. There are no penalties to collect. This means that to 
prevent mimicking when Highs report honestly, a strong bureau 
cannot have a strategy that produces net revenue after audit 
costs of more than 5. We need to rule out all such counterfactual 
strategies. 
Consider a strategy that yields more than 5 by inducing 
High agents to report Low and then imposing penalties. The 
strategy will involve a penalty P and an audit rate of low reports 
α > 0. The bureau’s revenue is made up of payments from (1) the 
80 percent of the agents who truthfully report Low, less the 
wasted audit costs (α × 2.5) for these agents, plus (2) the 20 per-
cent who inaccurately report Low, a fraction (1 − α) of whom are 
not audited plus (3) the 20 percent who inaccurately report Low, 
a fraction, α, of whom are audited and pay High plus penalties. 
This sum must be at most 5: 
 
0.8	×	 5 – 2.5α             
1
	+	0.2 5 1	–	α       
2
+α 11	+	P – 2.5                   
3
 	≤	5 
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Since α > 0, the only way for this equation to be satisfied is if 
P ≤ 6.5. To maintain the equilibrium, a strong bureau must not 
have the ability to impose a penalty greater than 6.5. 
When allowable penalties exceed this limit, a semiseparat-
ing equilibrium results. Strong bureaus lower their audit rate 
and collect more penalties relative to when the penalty is less 
than 6.5. Weak bureaus will mix it up: they will sometimes mim-
ic the strategy used by strong bureaus and sometimes reveal 
themselves by announcing a “no audit” strategy. Agents seeing a 
strategy that involves auditing will no longer be sure what type 
of bureau they are dealing with and they too will mix it up, 
sometimes reporting accurately and sometimes not. In particu-
lar, to decide how often to report accurately, High agents will 
consider the audit rate and penalties and their estimate of the 
probability that the bureau they face is strong or weak. In the 
end, some High agents will comply, some will not comply and get 
away with their transgression, and some noncompliers will get 
caught and pay the mandated penalty.29 
Compared to the case in which penalties are below the 
bound, compliance is lower because High agents sometimes re-
port Low rather than always reporting truthfully. They are no 
longer sure what type of bureau they are dealing with. That di-
lutes their incentives to report accurately. Higher penalties in-
crease the likelihood of mimicking and, therefore, can actually 
reduce compliance. 
This conclusion clashes with a simplistic view that higher 
penalties lead to greater compliance. Someone who is “tough on 
crime,” for example, might want to increase penalties. A claim 
that higher penalties increase compliance, however, requires 
holding all else equal, particularly the audit rates bureaus an-
nounce and the inferences that agents make about a bureau’s 
capabilities given its chosen behavior. Higher penalties may well 
lead to lower compliance as these factors may shift. 
 
  29  Although it is tempting to interpret the mixed strategy of a High agent literally, 
we recognize that only a few people actually flip a game-theoretic coin when deciding on 
a course of action. Instead, our preferred interpretation of this arrangement is to view 
the mixed strategy of a High agent as capturing the aggregate behavior of a large popu-
lation of High agents. The action taken by a particular agent may be driven by another 
(unmodeled) variable—such as his predisposition to embarrassment or his moral recti-
tude—that becomes pivotal when bureau strategies equate or nearly equate the mone-
tary returns to the two actions.  
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B.  Monitoring of Bureaus 
Suppose the ultimate principal, such as the legislature, the 
executive, or a citizen, wishes to determine whether a bureau’s 
SRA strategy is being implemented effectively. The most 
straightforward approach would be to observe whether agents 
comply with the law, but if the principal cannot directly observe 
compliance, it may have to turn to other indicators of effective-
ness. One superficially appealing possibility is audit hit rates: 
the principal might ask whether the bureau effectively marshals 
its resources by asking whether the bureau is targeting its au-
dits to regularly find noncompliance. For example, the chair of 
the Ways and Means Committee, which oversees the IRS, might 
expect to see the IRS use its audit resources to frequently find 
tax cheating. Another possibility is that the principal might look 
to see whether the bureau is wasting money, such as by spend-
ing it on fancy buildings or conferences. 
Much as with penalties, in which failure to consider the 
equilibrium effects can lead to misguided intuitions, an assess-
ment of bureau behavior that fails to consider the potential equi-
libria from an SRA strategy may be misleading. We cannot de-
termine from the audit hit rate whether the bureau is using a 
good SRA strategy: audit hit rates of any level are consistent 
with optimal strategies. And we may very well see bureaus en-
gaging in what looks like wasteful activity even when they are 
acting optimally. Auditing the auditors is a complex task when 
agents must infer bureau capabilities. Both conclusions—audit 
hit rates are not reliably informative and bureaus may engage 
in what looks like wasteful activity—follow immediately from 
the analysis above. 
Start with apparently wasteful activity. Strong bureaus 
have an incentive to engage in what looks like wasteful activity 
to prevent mimicking. Consider again the underlined separat-
ing-equilibrium box in the table. In the numerical example illus-
trating this case, the strong bureau’s revenue will be 5.2, made 
up of 5 from the 80 percent of reports that are low, less the costs 
of auditing half of these, plus 11 from the 20 percent of reports 
that are High: 
 
0.8(5 − 0.5 × 2.5) + 0.2 × 11 = 5.2 
 
If a strong bureau earns 5.2, however, a mimicking weak bureau 
would also earn 5.2. (If the weak bureau is able to mimic, penalties  
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are never imposed, so its inability to audit effectively is moot.) 
To prevent mimicking, the weak bureau cannot earn more than 
5. This means that a strong bureau must adopt a strategy that 
would reduce the revenue collected by a mimicking weak bureau 
to below 5. (That is, in the notation we use above, WM = WR = S.) 
Oftentimes, this ancillary activity also costs the strong bureau 
dearly. 
A strong bureau has several strategies for discouraging 
mimicry by a weak counterpart. Typically, a strong bureau must 
distort its behavior in a seemingly wasteful manner. For exam-
ple, it can increase the frequency of auditing low reports beyond 
50 percent. Holding the penalty fixed at 6.5 and increasing the 
audit rate does not alter agents’ behavior. High agents continue 
to report truthfully. For example, if the bureau audited 60 per-
cent of low reports, then its expected profits would equal 5. This 
extra 10 percent of audits is wasted because it neither deters 
misreporting (there was none at 50 percent auditing) nor collects 
any fines, since there is no misreporting. 
Alternatively, the bureau can “burn money” by auditing 
high reports. While these audits would be useless in the sense 
that they will never find noncompliance, they may indicate the 
bureau’s auditing strategy is fair in that all agents can get au-
dited. 
And it can spend the 0.2 of revenue on fancy architecture or 
conferences. While these expenditures seem on a quick examina-
tion to be purely wasteful, they may not be. If High agents be-
lieve that a bureau that does not burn money is weak, they will 
not report accurately. For example, a bureau that has an office 
in a run-down building may appear incapable of conducting ef-
fective audits. These inferences will affect agent behavior and 
possibly lower compliance. Trying to save money may be self-
defeating. 
Above we have identified but three possible actions a strong 
bureau can take to reduce the attractiveness of mimicking to the 
weak bureau. Many more are possible. Relative to allowing 
mimicking, however, strong bureaus gain only when the costs 
for a weak bureau to do the same exceed those of the strong bu-
reau.30 
 
  30  Thus, if a bureau were strong because its personnel were capable, it might pay 
for them to get graduate degrees even if those degrees were of no value in their work. A 
weak bureau saddled with less capable personnel would find it too costly to educate its  
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Unfortunately, while “burning money” may be wise, it may 
instead be wasteful. The possibility of signaling does not rule out 
the possibility of incompetence. Simply observing the potential 
waste is not enough to determine whether the activity is signal-
ing or genuine waste. 
Observing audit hit rates is no more helpful. Rates of zero—
audits fail to ever turn up noncompliance—arise in the separat-
ing equilibrium just analyzed. If a strong bureau is able to dif-
ferentiate itself from a weak bureau, agents will want to report 
truthfully to that bureau. If agents will report accurately, audits 
will never find underreports, and audit hit rates will be zero. We 
do not expect such an outcome in practice very often, but it is in-
structive as a polar case. Imagine a police chief bragging that 
there were zero arrests after a major public event or an account-
ing firm finding that a company’s financial statements are cor-
rect. Failure to find noncompliance does not mean that the 
strategy is either flaccid or inappropriate. The same argument 
applies as well to the case of a pooling equilibrium, in which all 
agents are honest, as we discuss below. 
Positive audit hit rates are also compatible with optimal 
strategies. If the penalty rate is above the 6.5 bound in the 
above example, agents, inferring mimicking, will sometimes re-
port inaccurately. Strong bureaus will discover these inaccura-
cies when these agents are selected for audit. Moreover, the ex-
pected positive hit rate will depend on important parameters, 
such as the percentage of High and Low agents and audit costs, 
and could be at almost any level. 
Unfortunately, both zero and positive hit rates are also 
compatible with negligent bureaus. A bureau that is entirely 
wasteful might have a very low audit hit rate simply because it 
is wasteful. A bureau with a high audit hit rate may not be 
properly implementing an SRA strategy, which would induce 
more, or fully, truthful reporting. More information is required 
to know whether a particular audit hit rate is appropriate. 
The lesson is that when there is two-sided private infor-
mation, it is perilous to look at a bureau’s auditing record and 
naively draw inferences about its effectiveness. A zero hit rate, 
any positive hit rate, and seemingly wasteful audits or other ex-
penditures are compatible with effective audit strategies. These 
 
employees similarly. The situation is analogous to that examined by Michael Spence, Job 
Market Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355, 358–59 (1973).  
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behaviors are also compatible with an incompetent bureau. A 
superficial examination cannot tell the difference. Effectively 
monitoring a bureau may require direct information on compli-
ance. 
C.  Mimicry by Weak Bureaus 
The possibility that weak bureaus may seek to mimic strong 
bureaus drove the discussion above. We turn now to examine 
when mimicking may occur in equilibrium and what the effects 
may be. In this Section, we consider a single bureau that may be 
either weak or strong. In the next Section, we consider the pos-
sibility that there are many bureaus. In the latter case, agents 
make inferences across bureaus, which means that the SRA 
strategies of bureaus interact. 
Mimicry may greatly expand the capacity for socially desir-
able laws to be effective. If auditing capabilities are weak, say 
because the law regulates in an area in which auditing is diffi-
cult, laws that are otherwise socially desirable may be less effec-
tive or not even enacted in the first place. If, however, a weak 
bureau can masquerade as a strong bureau, it might be able to 
get agents to send in accurate reports. 
Mimicry arises only when strong bureaus do not fully differ-
entiate themselves. The key that allows such an equilibrium is 
that the maximum allowable penalty is not large enough to in-
duce a strong bureau to have the incentive to lower audit rates 
and cash in on penalties on underreporting. A weak bureau can-
not follow such a strategy profitably (since its audits are ineffec-
tive). A sufficiently low cap on penalties produces this outcome. 
As noted, a cap on penalties is necessary to support both 
separating and pooling outcomes. In both cases the cap serves to 
constrain the behavior of strong bureaus by eliminating profita-
ble alternative actions that would lead the equilibria to unravel. 
Whether pooling instead of separation emerges depends on the 
costs of audits and the agent’s reasoned assessment of the audit-
ing bureau’s capability. If the cost of audits is high, a weak bu-
reau can more easily mimic because a strong bureau will be 
more reluctant to audit (the cost is higher). That is, as audit 
costs increase, the effective difference between bureau types 
shrinks. If the agent believes that the bureau is likely bad at 
auditing, mimicking will be harder. If these two factors work in 
the right direction—penalties are modest and agents believe  
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that there is a reasonable possibility that the audits are effec-
tive—weak bureaus may be able to mimic strong bureaus. 
One of the consequences of a pooling equilibrium is that au-
dits will have to be more frequent to induce accurate reporting. 
The reason is that agents will suspect that the bureau may be 
weak, reducing the incentive to report accurately for any given 
audit rate and penalty. 
To illustrate, consider a pooling equilibrium in which High 
agents always report honestly (the underlined pooling equilibri-
um in the table). Assume the same numbers as in the example 
above and suppose additionally that 20 percent of bureaus are 
weak and 80 percent are strong (and the maximum penalty is 
6.5). If both types of bureaus adopt the same auditing strategy 
in which a fraction α > 0 of low reports are audited, then a High 
agent reports truthfully if and only if the expected costs of a low 
report are worse than of a high report: 
 
0.2 × 5          
cost if
weak bureau
+ 0.8  1 – α  × 5 + α ×  11 + 6.5                        
cost if strong bureau
 1 1  
 
Hence, the audit rate must be 60 percent (or greater) for a High 
agent to report truthfully. The profit level of a typical bureau in 
this case is 5 because 
 
0.8(5 − 0.6 × 2.5) + 0.2 × 11 = 5 
 
This result, that with a bounded penalty and much mimicry, au-
dit rates must go up, means that an outcome with mimicking is 
costly, a point we return to in the next   Section. 
The possibility of mimicry opens a new avenue for the use of 
SRA strategies, namely in areas of the law in which agents will 
be unsure about the capabilities of a regulatory bureau. For ex-
ample, financial regulators may not be able to monitor banks 
and other financial entities (which we generically term “banks”) 
so as to control the risk externalities they impose, for example, 
by taking on excessive effective leverage. Banks may be one step 
ahead of the regulator, who cannot pay its employees to investi-
gate anywhere near the amounts that banks can pay theirs to 
camouflage the banks’ risk levels. This lack of regulator capabil-
ities is arguably at the center of the design of modern financial  
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regulation, including the Dodd-Frank rules, the bank capital 
rules, and so forth.31 How can we regulate if the regulators are 
systematically outmanned? Even if they could pay the same, but 
had far too few resources to monitor all banks, the same problem 
would apply. 
Suppose that we require banks to report compliance with 
some underlying goal and announce an audit rule based on those 
reports. For example, we could ask banks to report on their capi-
tal levels or what they expect their capital levels would be under 
various levels of stress or various economic scenarios. The bu-
reau would then decide whether to audit the bank and its report. 
The risk of audit would be based on the report that the bank 
submits, and would go up if the bank reported higher levels of 
capital, the strategic equivalent of a low report in the income tax 
example. 
Similarly, issuers of securities apparently get each offering 
graded by a rating agency.32 An alternative to this system of di-
rect monitoring would have issuers grade their own securities 
and then submit the grade (and presumably background mate-
rials) to a rating bureau. The bureau would audit some fraction 
of the reports. Issuers who report a high grade (which corre-
sponds to what we called a low-income report in the tax exam-
ple) would have a higher risk of audit and would suffer a signifi-
cant downgrade or other penalty if they were found to have 
overgraded. 
To work, the design of this audit mechanism must induce 
the bank to send in truthful reports even if the bank thinks 
there is a possibility that the bureau cannot effectively audit.33 
If, for example, a bureau with weak auditing capabilities can 
mimic one with strong capabilities, banks may send in truthful 
reports to a weak agency. If banks believe that audit bureaus 
are weak or audits are costly for bureaus, the SRA strategy may 
be ineffective. But the converse is also true. The SRA strategy 
may achieve regulatory leverage in arenas in which effective 
regulation was thought not possible. This suggests that strategies 
 
 31  See John C. Coffee Jr, The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Re-
form Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L Rev 1019, 1030 
(2012). 
  32  See Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the 
United States, 54 Am J Comp L 341, 341–43 & nn 2–5 (2006). 
  33   Self-reports also have the virtue that banks may face sanctions from the public 
if they submit reports that downplay risk and there is a subsequent failure. They will be 
seen as not only failing but also lying.   
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that change agents’ guesses about auditing capacities may be 
important. The greater the likelihood that a bureau is strong, 
the greater the temptation to mimic. For example, the IRS 
strategy of publicizing tax-fraud prosecutions just prior to April 
15 may induce truthful reporting if such accounts change agents’ 
beliefs about the IRS’s capabilities. 
This strategy could apply beyond the regulatory arena, for 
example, in the grading of any product. Thus, Consumer Reports 
could apply it to grading products, and universities could apply 
it to grading exams for at least some massive open online cours-
es (MOOCs). Any time that agents can assess their own perfor-
mance, they can be asked to grade themselves, with penalties—
possibly just pure information—if the oversight bureau has the 
potential to audit them and penalize misreports. 
D.  Externalities across Bureaus 
Our model of a bureau is of an entity enforcing a single 
stricture on an agent, such as mandating a single type of pollu-
tion-control equipment or imposing a tax on a single type of in-
come. Real bureaus enforce many strictures. The IRS must en-
force taxes on wage income, dividends, gains from domestically 
held investments, income hidden in tax havens, and numerous 
other sources. The EPA, even when considering a single type of 
pollution, may have a variety of mandates or fees to deal with 
differently situated agents. Stepping up one level in authority, a 
single department in the government may encompass many 
complex bureaus. The executive oversees many departments. 
If policies must cover many bureaus (in the narrow sense of 
our model), they must be set to consider the interaction of SRA 
strategies across bureaus. The possibility of both mimicry and 
differentiation (signaling) make this a complex problem. The 
reason is that agents observing the behavior of one bureau may 
make inferences about other bureaus. 
Weak bureaus can impose negative externalities on strong 
bureaus. Consider a pooling equilibrium, where weak bureaus 
mimic strong bureaus. As illustrated by our example, if agents 
cannot tell what type of bureau they are facing, it will take more 
audits to convince agents that it is desirable to report accurate-
ly. The weak bureau forces the strong bureau to incur greater 
auditing costs, thus creating a negative externality. 
Perhaps surprisingly, weak bureaus can also impose posi-
tive externalities on strong bureaus. If allowable penalties are  
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large and agents think they may be facing a weak bureau, they 
may sometimes underreport in a semiseparating equilibrium. 
Strong bureaus may benefit because they will collect penalties 
when they catch the underreporting. 
The net effect, a positive or negative externality, will depend 
on the parameters of the problem. In general, each type of bu-
reau will prefer that there are more of the other type. When al-
most all bureaus are strong, mimicry becomes attractive. A 
weak bureau can get lost in the crowd of its strong cousins. 
When almost all bureaus are weak, misreports will be abundant, 
and strong bureaus will catch and penalize a lot of misreporters. 
Acknowledging trade-offs across bureaus, the best policy 
may be complex, and policies that initially seem misguided may 
in fact be making this trade-off correctly. For example, it is often 
observed that the audit and penalty rate for inaccurate tax re-
turns is too low to induce tax compliance, because underreport-
ing has a lower expected cost than honest reporting. If, however, 
a higher penalty rate would allow agents to infer in which areas 
the IRS is strong and in which areas it is weak, overall tax com-
pliance might even go down. A low penalty and audit rate may 
be desirable given the externalities across areas of tax compli-
ance even though if we look at a single area, it looks suboptimal. 
We are only speculating on the possibility, but it is clear that 
once one considers the complexity of the setting, casual intui-
tions that penalties or audits need to be increased may be incor-
rect. 
CONCLUSION  
We conclude by suggesting further lines of research on SRA 
strategies. Our model includes only two types of agents and two 
types of bureaus. In reality, there are many types, and extend-
ing the model to many types would be worthwhile and could lead 
to qualitatively different results. In addition, our model is of a 
single bureau. Formally modeling multiple bureaus operating 
simultaneously is likely a difficult task but may yield insights. 
Another important extension would allow for probabilistic 
rather than certain detection of misreports by strong bureaus. 
People presumably would vary in their ability to avoid detection. 
For example, high-income taxpayers might be more capable of 
hiding monies than low-income taxpayers, and within an income 
class, some, for example, the self-employed, would be better  
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hiders than others, for example, salaried employees. This possibil-
ity may lead to different, perhaps dramatically different, results. 
Given constraints on government resources and investiga-
tive capabilities, SRA strategies are inevitable. Indeed, many 
are already in place. Their operation creates a subtle game in 
which agents withhold information from bureaus, some bureaus 
signal to reveal information, and others mimic to hide it. Casual 
interpretation of bureau behavior may be incorrect. For exam-
ple, higher penalties may not lead to greater compliance and bu-
reaus may not want to employ SRA strategies that yield high 
audit hit rates. In addition, our results suggest that there may 
be many critical areas where legal rules can be fruitfully en-
forced through SRA mechanisms. For example, we suggested the 
possibility that bank regulation may be a good area for relying 
on an SRA mechanism. Future work should explore the broad 
potential for SRA mechanisms in fostering cost-effective regula-
tion. 